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The Failure of Section 1237 in Dealing with
Sales of Subdivided Realty
Fred C. Chandler, Jr.*
Land sales, one of the most common forms of capital
transactions, are exceeded in dollar volume only by the sale of
corporate stock.' Unlike stockholders, however, landowners
have available neither the "trader" classification under section
1221(1) of the Internal Revenue Code2 nor any other statutory
means of recording their assets as "investments.13 Consequently,
they often are unable to take advantage of the preferential
capital gains rates at which gains realized from the sale of their
land would otherwise be taxed. Thus courts, in seeking to pro-
tect landowners who might fairly be regarded as investors, have
had to develop a convoluted tax treatment of land transactions.
The central tax problem in real estate sales is whether
property sold by the taxpayer will be treated as an investment
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden.
1. INTmtINAL BEuE Svic, STATISTiCS OF INcom--1962, Sup-
PL mENTAL REPORT, SALKs or CAPrrAL AssETs REPoRTED ox INDnIIDuAL IN-
coAM TAX RETURNs 5 (1966) (The 1972 statistics are not as yet avail-
able).
2. Under section 1221 (1), a stockholder, if not a mere passive "in-
vestor," may still be classified as a "trader" rather than a "dealer" so that
his shares may be regarded as capital assets. A landowner may only be
an "investor" or a "dealer." Compare Commissioner v. Burnett, 118 F.2d
659 (5th Cir. 1941) (taxpayer characterized as a trader in securities),
with Black v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 204 (1941) (trader status rejected
as inapplicable to real estate transactions).
In George R. Kemon, 16 T.C. 1026 (1951), the court observed that
both dealers and traders in securities purchase stock with the expectation
of selling it at a profit. The court concluded that a dealer derives his
profit from selling his stock to a subsequent purchaser at a price greater
than his original cost. The profit thus represents remuneration for the
efforts he has expended in performing this merchandising function. Id.
at 1033. On the other hand, the court characterized a trader in securities
as a person who realizes his profit not from any merchandising function
that he performs, but rather from merely disposing of his securities after
they have appreciated in value as a consequence of the natural forces of
the market. Id. at 1032.
3. Even a dealer in securities may secure nondealer treatment by
designating specific securities as held for investment so that at disposi-
tion they will be considered capital assets. INT. REv. CoD. OF 1954,
§ 1236. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended, unless otherwise specified.
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or as inventory. If the taxpayer is regarded as holding the prop-
erty as an "investor," the resulting gain on its sale will be taxed
as capital gains;4 but if he is regarded as holding inventory prop-
erty "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business," he will be treated as a "dealer,",; and
the resulting gain will be taxed as ordinary income.6
To realize the maximum return from his investment, an
owner of real estate often must subdivide 7 his property before
selling it; but, by engaging in such activity, he begins to move
toward dealer status8 and higher tax rates.9 Because investor
4. Id. § 1201.
5. A dealer in real property is a oerson who holds real prop-
erty as inventory or stock in trade, or as property held for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1954).
While not appearing in the statutes, the terms "dealer" and "in-
vestor" are often used to distinguish a taxpayer who holds property pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness from one who does not-a critical question when dealing with the
statutory language of sections 1221 (1), 1231, or 1237 of the Code.
6. See INT.R Ev. CoDEoF 1954, § 61(a) (3).
7. Ordinarily, subdivision of real estate involves planning, engi-
neering, appearing before local governing bodies, and filing a subdivision
map. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANN=,a AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CON-
TROL LAW 252 (1971).
8. The court in Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D.
Iowa 1947) (decided under sections 22 and 117 of the 1939 Code), recog-
nized that
[tlhe line between the situation where a taxpayer is merely
holding property for sale and the situation where his activities in
connection with the sale of property constitutes the doing of
business under the tax statutes is frequently difficult to draw.
Id. at 1005. From its examination of the relevant case law, however,
the court discerned an appropriate distinction between dealers and
investors in real estate:
It would seem that to carry on a business conveys the idea of
progression, continuity and sustained and normally incident ac-
tivity, and does not mean the performance of single disconnected
acts. Continuity, in the case of a real estate enterprise, would
hence seem to connote that characteristic of the business as a
"going concern," as distinguished from sporadic activity lacking
the studied purpose or continuing objective of the entrepreneur-
realtor. The occasional purchase and resale of land by an in-
vestor speculating on a rise in real estate values, does not, in the
absence of other circumstances, give rise to the status of his be-
ing a dealer in real estate.... On the other hand, [a] taxpayer
who through his agent was actively engaged in subdivision, im-
provement, and selling work during the tax years in question for
the obvious reason of obtaining a larger profit [has been] held
to be in the business of selling real estate. Such management
activity by [a] taxpayer, his agents, or servants, is generally
held to supply the continuity requisite for a business ....
Id. at 1002-03.
9. Assume, for example, that an individual taxpayer in the 70 per-
cent bracket sells real property and that lie realizes and recognizes a gain
[Vol. 60:275
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status and dealer status overlap, many cases have arisen in which
courts have attempted to determine whether property has been
held as an investment or as inventory.10
Until 1954, the only statutory guidance available to courts
facing this problem was that of section 117 (a) (1) of the 1939 Code
(now section 1221 (1)), which excluded from capital asset treat-
ment "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.""
Drawing from this feeble assistance by Congress, the courts pro-
duced a confusing and inconsistent body of case law.12 Then,
in 1954 Congress enacted section 1237,3 which contains detailed
rules regarding tax treatment of land subdivided for purposes
of sale. This section was hailed as an important and necessary
of $50,000 in the year of sale. If the property sold is treated as a capital
asset and if it has been held for over six months, tax liability will range
from $12,500 under section 1202 of the Code to $17,500 under section 1201.
On the other hand, classification of the taxpayer as a dealer will result
in ordinary income treatment and tax liability under section 1 of $35,000.
10. See cases cited in notes 33 and 36 infra.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1), 53 Stat. 50 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1221 (1)).
12. See Primmer, Sales of Subdivided Realty-Capital Gains v. Or-
dinary Income, 19 Sw. L.J. 116 (1965).
13. (a) GENERAL. Any lot or parcel which is part of a
tract of real property in the hands of a taxpayer other than a
corporation shall not be deemed to be held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of trade or business at the time
of sale solely because of the taxpayer having subdivided such
tract for purposes of sale or because of any activity incident to
such subdivision or sale, if-(1) such tract, or any lot or parcel thereof, had not previ-
ously been held by such taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of trade or business (unless such tract at
such previous time would have been covered by this section)
and, in the same taxable year in which the sale occurs, such tax-
payer does not so hold any other real property; and(2) no substantial improvement that substantially en-
hances the value of the lot or parcel sold is made by the tax-
payer on such tract while held by the taxpayer or is made pur-
suant to a contract of sale entered into between the taxpayer and
the buyer. For purposes of this paragraph, an improvement
shall be deemed to be made by the taxpayer if such improve-
ment was made by-(A) the taxpayer or members of his family (as defined
in section 267(c) (4)), by a corporation controlled by the
taxpayer, or by a partnership which included the taxpayer
as a partner; or(B) a lessee, but only if the improvement constitutesincome to the taxpayer; or(C) Federal, State, or local government, or political
subdivision thereof, but only if the improvement constitutes
an addition to basis for the taxpayer; and(3) such lot or parcel, except in the case of real property
acquired by inheritance or devise, is held by the taxpayer for a
period of 5 years.
1976]
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addition to the Code, a statute that would provide taxpayers with
proper guideposts that they could follow without fear of becom-
ing involved in litigation with the Internal Revenue Service
(b) SPECIAL RULES FOR APPLICATION OF SECTION.
(1) GAINS. If more than 6 lots or parcels contained in the
same tract of real property are sold or exchanged, gain from any
sale or exchange (which occurs in or after the taxable year in
which the sixth lot or parcel is sold or exchanged) of any lot or
parcel which comes within the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2)
and (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed to be
gain from the sale of property held primarily for sale to custo-
mers in the ordinary course of the trade or business to the extent
of 5 percent of the selling price.
(2) EXPENDITURES OF SALE. For the purpose of com-
puting gain under paragraph (1) of this subsection, expenditures
incurred in connection with the sale or exchange of any lot or
parcel shall neither be allowed as a deduction in computing tax-
able income, nor treated as reducing the amount realized on such
sale or exchange; but so much of such expenditures as does not
exceed the portion of gain deemed under paragraph (1) of this
subsection to be gain from the sale of property held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business
shall be so allowed as a deduction, and the remainder, if any,
shall be treated as reducing the amount realized on such sale or
exchange.
(3) NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS. No improvement
shall be deemed a substantial improvement for purposes of sub-
section (a) if the lot or parcel is held by the taxpayer for a pe-
riod of 10 years and if-
(A) such improvement is the building or installation
of water, sewer, or drainage facilities or roads (if such im-
provement would except for this paragraph constitute a sub-
stantial improvement);(B) it is shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary or
his delegate that the lot or parcel, the value of which was
substantially enhanced by such improvement, would not
have been marketable at the prevailing local price for simi-
lar building sites without such improvement; and
(C) the taxpayer elects, in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, to make no
adjustment to basis of the lot or parcel, or of any other prop-
erty owned by the taxpayer, on account of the expenditures
for such improvements. Such election shall not make any
item deductible which would not otherwise be deductible.
(c) TRACT DEFINED. For purposes of this section, the
term "tract of real property" means a single piece of real prop-
erty, except that 2 or more pieces of real property shall be con-
sidered a tract if at any time they were contiguous in the hands
of the taxpayer or if they would be contiguous except for the in-
terposition of a road, street, railroad, stream, or similar property.
If, following the sale or exchange of any lot or parcel from a
tract of real property, no further" sales or exchanges of any other
lots or parcels from the remainder of such tract are made for a
period of 5 years, such remainder shall be deemed a tract.(d) EFFECTIVE DATE. This section shall apply only
with respect to sales of property occurring after December 31,
1953, except that, for purposes of subsection (c) (defining tract
of real property) and for determining the number of sales under
paragraph (1) of subsection (b), all sales of lots and parcels
from any tract of real property during the period of 5 years be-
fore December 31, 1953, shall be taken into account, except as
provided in subsection (c).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237.
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(IRS) .14 Disappointingly, the statute has failed to live up to
those expectations.
I. GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 1237
A. K.EY LANGUAGE
To qualify for favorable treatment of gains from the sale
of subdivided realty under section 1237, the taxpayer 5 must
satisfy three principal conditions: (1) he must not have pre-
viously held the subject property for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business; moreover, during the year of sale he
must not so hold any other property; 16 (2) he must have held
the property for at least five years unless he acquired it by
inheritance or devise; 17 and (3) he must not have made any
"substantial improvements" to the property that have "substan-
tially enhanced" the value of the lots sold.18
If a taxpayer satisfies these conditions, land that he sells will
be deemed not to have been "held primarily for sale to customers
14. See, e.g., Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real Estate--"Dealer" v.
"Investor" Problem, 11 TAx L. REv. 157, 173 (1956).
15. Until 1971, any "taxpayer other than a corporation" was eligible
for the benefits of section 1237. INT. REV. CODE *6 1954, § 1237 (a). While
this might have been taken to imply that a subdividing corporation auto-
matically becomes a dealer, nothing in the legislative history suggests
that Congress intended such a result. Moreover, in amending this lan-
guage in 1971, Congress specified certain circumstances under which a lot
or parcel of real property that is sold or exchanged by a corporation is
not to be treated as property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of trade or business. Generally, a corporation can qual-
ify for capital gains treatment under section 1237 if it holds land for 25
years before sale, if it acquired such property through a lien foreclosure
prior to 1934, and, with certain limited exceptions, if it acquires no addi-
tional property after 1956. Property can be acquired after 1956 to fill
gaps in previously acquired property, to adjust boundaries, or to facili-
tate the installation of streets, utilities, and other public facilities, or if
the property is a reacquisition of property previously owned by the cor-
poration. Property acquired prior to 1957 in the near vicinity of qualified
pre-1934 property will not, if sold, disqualify the corporation from capital
gains treatment. Such treatment will be denied to a corporation, how-
ever, if any stockholder is directly or indirectly a dealer in real property.
Gain from the sale or exchange of any of this property is deemed to be
gain from the sale of property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of trade or business to the extent of five percent of the
selling price. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1237(a), (b) (3) (Supp. 1976), amending
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a).
16. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 1237 (a) (1).
17. Id. § 1237 (a) (3). If the taxpayer inherited the property, no
five-year holding period is required for purposes of section 1237. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1237-1(d) (2) (1957).
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237(a),(2).
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in the ordinary course of trade or business."1 9 Instead, the
property will be treated as a "capital asset" under section 1221,
and the gain realized by a taxpayer on its sale or exchange will
be taxed as capital gain 20 rather than as ordinary income.21
Assuming that the phrase "primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of [his] trade or business 22 means the
same thing in both section 1221(1) and section 1237,23 the two
statutes overlap. A question thus arises as to which section
should first be applied when characterizing gain realized from
the sale of subdivided realty. Consistent with the suggestion
that section 1237 is -the appropriate starting point,24 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Gault v. Commissioner2 r
looked first to that section, but concluded that since the taxpayer
had failed to satisfy its conditions, it afforded him no relief. The
court observed, however, that section 1237 was not the exclusive
route to capital gains treatment and proceeded to resolve the case
on the basis of the traditional "investor" versus "dealer" distinc-
tion under section 1221(1).26
On the other hand, the Tax Court has looked first to section
1221 (1); only after resolving that under that section the taxpayer
is a dealer has it gone on to determine whether he qualifies for
relief under section 1237.27 The regulations promulgated under
19. Id. § 1237(a).
20. Id. § 1201. The taxpayer must hold the asset for more than six
months in order to qualify for the preferential rates afforded long-term
capital gains. Id. § 1223.
21. Id. § 61(a) (3). "Capital asset" is defined to exclude "property
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business." Id. § 1221 (1).
22. The word "his" appears in section 1221 (1) of the 1954 Code but
is omitted from the corresponding phrases in subsections (a) and (a) (1)
of section 1237.
23. One may pause momentarily over whether the phrase "primar-
ily for sale to customers" necessarily means the same thing under both
sections. The phrase arises in a somewhat different context in section
1237, which contains no specific reference to section 1221 (1). Section
1237 is directed specifically to real property while section 1221 (1) covers
all types of property; capital asset treatment under 1221 (1) ordinarily
produces only capital gain while such treatment under 1237 may produce
a combination of capital gain and ordinary income. See text accom-
panying notes 79-92 infra.
24. Boughner, Getting Capital Gain Treatment on Sale of Land-
With or Without Section 1237, 25 J. TAx. 172 (1966).
25. 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1965).
26. Id. at 97. The court held that the taxpayer was a dealer.
27. See Estate of Peter Finder, 37 T.C. 411 (1961); Gordy v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C. 855 (1961). But see *Robert W. Pointer, 48 T.C. 906
(1967), affd on other grounds, 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969).
(Vol. 60:275
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section 1237 also reflect this approach.2 8 In any event, the start-
ing point makes a difference only if, in a particular case, both
sections are satisfied. Then, section 1221 (1) would provide com-
plete capital gains treatment, while section 1237 would reserve
a small portion of the gain for taxation at ordinary rates.29
28. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (4) (i) (1957).
29. Under section 1237 (b) (1) of the Code, gain from any sale of the
property occurring in or after the taxable year in which the sixth sale
is made is taxable as ordinary income to the extent of five percent of the
selling price. See text accompanying notes 79-92 infra.
Conclusive resolution of which section is the starting point is un-
likely since it is not clear whether Congress originally intended section
1237 to apply mandatorily to a taxpayer who meets all of its require-
ments. Since section 1237 is not an elective provision, this possibility
was at least left open. Moreover, the statutory language is of a manda-
tory nature, with subsection (a) providing that "[a] ny lot or parcel ...
shall not be deemed to be held primarily for sale to customers ...."
(Emphasis added.) Early reaction to the section was that it was, in fact,
a mandatory provision. See Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real Estate-
"Dealer" v. "Investor" Problem, 11 TAx. L. Rnv. 157, 173 (1956). If this
were indeed the case, it would then follow that the taxpayer who meets
all of the requirements of section 1237 is automatically subject to the sec-
tion, even if he does not desire such a result. The Commissioner, how-
ever, has not treated section 1237 as mandatory, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-
1 (a) (4) () (1957). On the other hand, if it were treated as mandatory,
its impact could produce questionable results in the following areas: (1)
ordinary income under the five percent rule, (2) overlap with section
1231, and (3) characterization of losses.
Ordinary Income Under the Five Percent Rule. If a taxpayer, inten-
tionally or otherwise, fulfills all of the requirements of section 1237 but
sells more than five lots, up to five percent of his gain could be treated
as ordinary income. See text accompanying notes 79-92 infra. Under
section 1221(1), however, the same taxpayer might be entitled to full
capital gain treatment simply by avoiding classification as a dealer. See
notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text. But if the Commissioner took
the position that section 1237 is mandatory, he could claim that the tax-
payer owes the higher tax that might result under that section.
Overlap with Section 1231. Property subdivided and sold by the
taxpayer that is not "held primarily for sale to customers," but that is
"used in his trade or business," is not a capital asset under section 1221
(1); it may be subject to section 1231, however. See INr. REV. CoDE OF
1954, § 1231(b). Under the special treatment of that section, the tax-
payer would be entitled to long-term capital gains treatment of the full
amount of his gain from the sale of a 1231 asset. See id. § 1231(a). If
section 1237 were mandatory, a portion of the selling price could be con-
sidered "gain from the sale of property held primarily for sale to custo-
mers in the ordinary course of trade or business" provided the five per-
cent rule of that section was applicable. See text accompanying notes
79-86 infra. Since such property is excluded from section 1231, INT. REV.
CODE or 1954, § 1231(b) (1) (A), the portion of 1231 property so classified
would arguably not be afforded capital gains treatment under that sec-
tion. The Regulations promulgated under section 1237, however, provide
that if property is used in the taxpayer's trade or business, subdivision
19761
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B. BACKGROUND AD PuRPos. OF SEFCTION 1237
Section 1237 represents the first attempt by Congress to
specifically distinguish investors from dealers in real estate. The
distinction is important because of the substantially higher rates
at which dealers are taxed.30
Before the enactment of section 1237, courts had frequently
been asked to determine the point at which the activities of a
taxpayer resulted in a change in his status from investor to
dealer. Under the controlling statute, now section 1221(1),31
real property could not have been deemed an investment if it
had been held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business. Courts treated this question
as one of fact, setting forth various evidentiary tests by which
it could be resolved.32 No single factor was viewed as
determinative. Rather, the courts considered the relationship
throughout the relevant time period of (1) the purpose of
activities are to be disregarded and gain from its sale is to be treated
under section 1231. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237.1(f) (1957).
Characterization of Losses. Under both sections 1221(1) and 1237,
an asset apparently is characterized as capital or as held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business regardless of whether
a particular transaction resulted in a gain or a loss. And while section
1237 makes no specific provision for losses, the mandatory language of
subsection (a) certainly suggests that, provided all the 1237 requirements
are met, losses realized on sales of subdivided realty would necessarily
be characterized as capital losses. If this were so, and since capital losses
are subject to severe limitations of deductibility, see INT. REv. CODE OP
1954, §§ 165(f), 1211, 1212, the taxpayer facing losses on his real es-
tate dealings would want the parcels in question to be treated as prop-
erty held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness so that he could claim ordinary loss deductions.
A taxpayer would never have to face this particular problem, how-
ever, since the regulations specifically provide that section 1237 is inap-
plicable to losses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(a) (4) (i) (1957). Thus a
taxpayer could secure capital gains treatment of the gains realized from
the sale of certain lots in a subdivided tract and, at the same time, deduct
the losses suffered on the sale of other lots in the same tract. But to
achieve such a result, the taxpayer would have to walk a tightrope. Hle
would first have to satisfy the statutory requirements of section 1237 to
secure capital gains treatment, see text accompanying note 54 infra; then,
to be able to deduct ordinary losses he must establish himself as a dealer
in real estate under the dealer-investor decisions, see cases cited in notes
33 and 36 infr a, relying on those subdivision activities that were per-
mitted under section 1237. See text accompanying notes 40-48 infra.
30. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
31. INT. RPv. CODE or 1939, § 117(a) (1), 53 Stat. 50 (now INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 1221 (1)).
32. See Miller, Tax Status of Subdivisions under the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 33 CH.-KENT L. Rsv. 201 (1955).
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acquisition, (2) the historical and recent use of the property, (3)
the lapse of time between acquisition and sale, (4) improvements
to the property, (5) the frequency, continuity, and substantiality
of sales, (6) the activities of the taxpayer or his agent, including
time expended in development and sales, (7) the primary occupa-
tion of the taxpayer, and (8) the purpose of the disposition.33
Inasmuch as this case-by-case approach was unpredictable,
Congress sought to devise a form of statutory relief for the
taxpayer.34 The focus of congressional attention was the inves-
tor who found himself in the position of having to subdivide his
land in order to liquidate it in a financially reasonable manner.35
Under prior case law, an investor who subdivided and sold his
property usually had been held, perhaps often to his surprise,
to be a dealer and therefore unentitled to capital gains treat-
ment.36 By enacting section 1237, Congress intended to remove
this "uncertainty" and "inequity."3 7
C. APPLICATION OF SECTiON 1237 TO DEALER-INVESTOR
PROBLEMS
Under both section 1221(1) and section 1237, holding real
property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business
33. See, e.g., Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952);
Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1950); Snell v.
Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938); Austin v. United States, 116
F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1953); Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp.
997 (N.D. Iowa 1947); W.T. Thrift, 15 T.C. 366 (1950).
34. See Brodsky, Converting Ordinary Assets into Capital Assets,
N.Y.U. 13TH INsT. o N FED. TAX 1173, 1178 (1955); Weithorn, Subdivisions
of Real Estate----"Dealer" v. "Investor" Problem, 11 TAX. L. REV. 157, 165
(1956); cf. Mann, Tax Consequences of Subdividing Real Estate, 15
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 303 (1958).
35. At present, an individual who subdivides real property held
for investment purposes is likely to be held a dealer and sub-jected to ordinary income tax rates on the entire long-term gain.
However, an individual holding real property for investment
may find that the only way to dispose of it at a reasonable price
is to subdivide it into lots.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1954).
36. See, e.g., Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th
Cir. 1952); Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952);
McFaddin v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); Brown v. Com-
missioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944); Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d
363 (4th Cir. 1944); Oliver v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1943);
Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
668 (1941).
37. Representative Reed, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, indicated such an intent when he first introduced his com-




is fatal to capital gains treatment. The relevant provisions are
structured differently, however; section 1221(1) simply excludes
such property from capital asset classification, while section 1237
provides that a taxpayer will not be deemed to be holding prop-
erty for sale to customers "solely because"3 8 he has subdivided
it or engaged in certain related activities.
Section 1237 has achieved its greatest impact by allowing
certain activities to be disregarded in determining whether a
taxpayer is a dealer, activities that before 1954 would have
made him a dealer in most cases.3 9 No specific definition of
these activities appears in the statute; instead, they merely
are referred to as "subdividing a tract for purposes of sale" and
"any activity incident to such subdivision or sale."40 The Regu-
lations define incidental activities as advertising, promotion, and
related selling activities, including the use of sales agents.41
Amplifying the statutory language, "solely because," the Regula-
tions also provide that such subdividing and related activities are
to be disregarded when they are the only substantial evidence
that the taxpayer has ever held real property primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his business. 42 Con-
versely, when other substantial evidence does tend to show that
the taxpayer has so held real property, subdividing activities are
to be considered as well.43
While statutory approval of subdivision and related activities
seemed at first to represent a significant departure from prior
case law, the Commissioner's examples of "other substantial
evidence" that may disqualify the taxpayer are extremely broad;
consequently, they have significantly narrowed the potential
scope of section 1237. These examples include (1) selling activi-
ties by the taxpayer in connection with other property in prior
years, if he had engaged at the same time in subdividing and
selling activities with respect to the subject tract, (2) intention
of the taxpayer in prior years or at the time of acquisition to
38. In the Regulations, the Commissioner translates "solely" to
mean "merely," stating:
This rule is to permit taxpayers qualifying under it to sell real
estate from a single tract held for investment without the income
being treated as ordinary income merely because of subdividing
the tract or of active efforts to sell it.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (1) (1957).
39. See cases cited in note 36 supra.
40. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (2) (ii) (1957).
42. Id. § 1.1237-1(a) (2).
43. Id. § 1.1237-1 (a) (3).
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hold the tract primarily for sale in the ordinary course of his
business, (3) subdivision of other tracts in the same year, (4)
holding other real property for sale to customers in the same
year,44 and (5) construction of a permanent real estate office
that the taxpayer could use in selling other property.45
If the taxpayer has avoided all of these obstacles, the
Regulations then provide a "break '40 by excluding from "other
substantial evidence" the following activities, if the taxpayer has
engaged in no more than one of them: (1) holding a real estate
dealer's license, (2) selling other real property held clearly for
investment, (3) acting as a salesman for a real estate dealer, but
without any financial interest in the business, and (4) merely
owning other vacant real property without engaging in any
selling activity with respect to it. 47 If, however, he has engaged
in more than one of these activities, "the circumstances may or
may not constitute substantial evidence that the taxpayer held
real property for sale in his business, depending upon the par-
ticular facts in each case."48
Thus the Commissioner has taken an already narrowly drawn
statute and further restricted it. The result is what appears to
be an elaborate system designed not merely to limit applica-
tion of the statute to "investors," but also tending to limit its
application to only an obvious nondealer engaged in a one-shot
transaction. To demonstrate the narrow scope of the statute and
the Regulations, consider the following situations:
(1) In the first year, the taxpayer subdivides a tract,
sells a few lots, and receives capital gain treatment because he
satisfied the requirements of section 1237. In the second year,
44. It should be noted that this particular example is drawn directly
from the statute. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237(a) (1).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (3) (1957).
46. This is a "break" in the limited sense that permitting one of
these activities provides some relief from prior case law. Cf. Levin, Cap-
ital Gains or Income Tax on Real Estate Sales, 37 BosToN U.L. REv. 165,
202 (1957).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (3) (1957).
48. Id. The Regulations clearly reflect the position that satisfaction
of the requirements of section 1237 is not the exclusive means by which
a taxpayer can preserve his status as an investor in real property. Id.
§ 1.1237-1 (a) (4) (i); text accompanying notes 39-43 supra. Under the
approach of treating section 1237 as evidentiary, the inquiry becomes
whether there is a lack of substantial other evidence of dealership
so that the court may disregard the subdivision activities in ques-
tion. Once the question of substantial other evidence is resolved against
the taxpayer, he would be unable to rely on section 1237 and would prob-
ably be considered a dealer under section 1221 (1) case law. See cases
cited in note 36 supra.
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the taxpayer sells additional lots from the same tract, but also
becomes a dealer with respect to property other than the sub-
divided tract. He loses his section. 1237 qualification in the sec-
ond year because in that year, the year of the subject sales,
he held other real property for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business.49
(2) The taxpayer, a real estate dealer with wide holdings,
retires and disposes of all of his property except one ranch. He
leases the ranch, holds it as an investment for five years, then
subdivides and sells it in compliance with the requirements of
section 1237. He will lose his section 1237 qualification because
the subject property was "previously held" for sale to cus-
tomers. 50
(3) A taxpayer who owns three tracts of land subdivides
and sells tract 1, complying with all of the requirements of
section 1237. He also sells tract 2, which he clearly held as
an investment; he continues to passively hold vacant tract 3.
Unassuringly to the taxpayer, the Commissioner "may or may
not" take the position that these circumstances constitute sub-
stantial other evidence that the taxpayer has held real property
for sale to customers.51
(4) The taxpayer holds two separate tracts of land as
investments for more than five years. Complying with all of
the requirements of section 1237, he subdivides both tracts and
sells all of the lots. Here the Commissioner asserts that, with
respect to each tract, the activities of the taxpayer in connection
with the subdivision and sale of the other tract must be con-
sidered in determining whether the subject tract has been held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. 52
49. IwT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237(a) (1). That the taxpayer must
not hold any other real property for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business is thus an ongoing requirement.
50. Id. By requiring that the tract must not have been previously
held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, this
section codifies prior cases holding that the earlier intent of the tax-
payer is a factor that must be considered in determining dealership
status. See Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952);
Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947). In con-
trast to the case law, however, section 1237 fails to take into account a
possible change in such intent.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (3) (1957).
52. Id. The Commissioner's interpretation of section 1237(a) (1) is
consistent with the relevant legislative history:
[E]ngaging in the subdivision of other pieces of real property
... shall be taken into consideration in determining whether the
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In view of these Regulations, all that this "relief" section
provides, if anything, is a rather shallow safe harbor for capital
gain that is available only to the relatively few taxpayers who
might qualify under its complex provisions. And most of the
rare taxpayers who could thread the needle of section 1237 and
the accompanying Regulations would probably qualify for capital
gains treatment anyway under section 1221 (1) case law.53
II. SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF SECTION 1237
Assuming that the taxpayer satisfies the threshold require-
ment of section 1237-he has never held the subject property for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and, during
the year of sale, does not so hold any other property 54-he
must then carefully follow the detailed recipe of the section
and the Regulations relating to the manner of subdividing the
tract, the five-year holding period, permissible improvements,
and attribution of improvements, and at all times remain wary
of the five percent ordinary income rule.
A. SUBDIVIDING A "TRAcT" INO "LOTS OR PARCELS"
Since application of section 1237 centers on the concept of
subdividing a "tract of real property" into "lots or parcels," the
meaning of these terms is critical. At issue are the length of
the period during which the taxpayer must hold the "lot or
parcel" sold,5 the manner in which he may trigger the five
percent ordinary income rule by selling "more than 5 lots or
parcels contained in the same tract,"'56 and the nature of a sub-
stantial improvement on the "tract" that substantially enhances
the value of the "lot or parcel" sold."
Section 1237(c) defines "tract of real property" as a "single
piece of real property,"58 but with two exceptions. First, two
specific property in question has ever been or is being held for
sale to customers.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954). Thus very limited ac-
tivities involving two small tracts may disqualify the taxpayer from sec-
tion 1237 treatment, while the same activities, engaged in on a much
larger scale on a much larger tract, would not be fatal to qualification
under the section-an uneven result at best.
53. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (1).
55. Id. § 1237(a) (3).
56. Id. § 1237(b) (1).
57. Id. § 1237(a) (2).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(g) (1) (1957).
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or more pieces are to be considered a single tract if they would
be contiguous but for interposition of "a road, street, railroad,
stream, or similar property."59 Second, two or more pieces are
to be considered one tract if at any time while held by the tax-
payer6 0 they were contiguous.61
Both of these exceptions may statutorily amalgamate into
a single tract property that otherwise might be regarded as two
or more tracts-a result that sometimes may be unrealistic. Con-
sider, for example, two sections of timber land divided by a large
river, not linked by a bridge, perhaps under separate local taxing
authorities, and regarded by the owner as functionally separate
tracts. For the purpose of section 1237, they would constitute
a single tract.6 2 Or suppose that a taxpayer who owns a row
of three city blocks sells the middle block. While the two
remaining blocks are now separated, they nevertheless would be
deemed a single tract for the purpose of section 1237 since they
were once held contiguously by the taxpayer.6 3
As a result of such amalgamation, section 1237 may be of
limited use to the taxpayer. In one instance, he would need to
be concerned with whether substantial improvements made on
one tract would substantially enhance the value of lots on the
other tract, since these physically separate pieces may be amal-
gamated rather than regarded as separate tracts.64 In another,
59. This rule means that if the boundary lines of the pieces of
real property were continued in the same direction in which they
were running at the time they met the road, street, railroad,
stream, or similar property, the two pieces of real property then
would meet at more than a single point.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1954).
60. Congress apparently meant any time in the previous five years.
See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A285 (1954); S. REP. No. 1662,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1954).
61. The taxpayer need not have acquired such contiguous properties
by a single deed, and he may hold them individually, jointly, or as a
partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(g) (1) (1957).
62. See note 59 supra.
63. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (c). If the taxpayer does not sell
another lot from the tract for a period of five years from the sale of the
middle lot, however, the remainder of ihe tract will then be considered
a "new tract." Id. The basic definition of 'tract" as including pieces of
real property that at any time had been held contiguously by the tax-
payer presumably would be unaffected by this result since the Regula-
tions provide that "[t]he pieces in the new tract need not be contigu-
ous." Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (g) (2) (1957).
For the effect of this provision on the five percent ordinary income
rule, see text accompanying notes 81-82 infra.
64. See text accompanying notes 107-08 infra. On the other hand,
amalgamation would eliminate the problem of how subdividing and sell-
ing activities as to one tract affect the characterization of other tracts.
See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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he might sell five lots from tract 1, complying with the re-
quirements of section 1237, and in the same year sell tract 2
to a single buyer. Ordinarily, the sale of tract 2 would receive
full capital gains treatment under section 1221;65 but, since
there is deemed to be but one tract, the sixth sale would trigger
the five percent ordinary income rule of section 1237.66
To receive full capital gains treatment, the taxpayer must sell
no more than five "lots or parcels" from the subdivided tract
within a five-year period.67 The Code, however, fails to define
these terms, leaving wide and varied the range of the size and
type of tracts that might be permissibly or impermissibly sub-
divided under section 1237. Consider, for example, these possi-
bilities: a 100,000 acre ranch in arid southern New Mexico
divided into "small" 20,000 acre ranches; a 25 acre farm in Penn-
sylvania divided into five-acre "farmettes"; a 10 acre lemon
grove in California divided into two-acre "ranchettes"; a five-
acre tract in Cleveland's Shaker Heights divided into one-acre
"estates"; one acre in Ocean City, New Jersey divided into one-
fifth acre lots for construction of summer vacation homes; one-
fourth acre in Manhattan divided to accommodate five walk-up
townhouses, each occupying one-twentieth of an acre.
65. In this situation, however, the Commissioner 'may or may not"
take the position that engaging in selling activities with respect to more
than one tract indicates that the property was held for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business. See note 51 supra and accompanying
text.
66. See text accompanying notes 79-92 infra. To avoid these unfa-
vorable results, the taxpayer could create two tracts by making a gift of
a portion of land that would otherwise be deemed a single tract under
section 1237. Since the length of time for which the donee holds the
property is tacked to that of the donor, the required five-year holding pe-
riod would run from the date of original acquisition of the whole tract
rather than from the date a portion of it was received by the donee. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (d) (1) (1957); text accompanying notes 70-78 infra.
Thus, for example, a family member holding real property could extend
the coverage of section 1237 to other members of his family by giving
them pieces of his land, thereby establishing new tracts in their hands.
Such gifts probably should be made before subdividing since the Code
and Regulations refer to taxpayers who have subdivided a tract before
attempting to sell it. See INT. REv. Cons OF 1954, § 1237 (a); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1237-1 (a) (1) (1957). It is unclear whether donees of an already sub-
divided tract could rely on section 1237.
If the donee is to be able to qualify under section 1237, the donor,
prior to the gift, must not have made any substantial improvements to
the tract that substantially enhance the value of the parcels sold by the
donee from the subsequent subdivision of his new tract. See note 123 in-
fra and accompanying text.
67. See text accompanying notes 79-90 infra.
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Presumably, all of these divisions would be permissible
under section 1237. Assuming that in each instance the size of
the smaller parcel is best suited for the market, the goal of Con-
gress to make it easier from a tax standpoint for a taxpayer to
subdivide his property in order to sell it at a reasonable price
would be realized.68 But what of the many situations where
dividing the property into but five parcels may be economically
infeasible, such as would probably be true of a 250 acre farm in
Pennsylvania or a 100 acre lemon grove in California? In these
instances, by limiting full capital gains treatment to the sale of
only five parcels, the impact of the statute is to penalize owners
of larger tracts; 69 yet, nothing in the legislative history suggests
that Congress intended the statute to have such an effect.
B. FrvE-YEAR HOLDING PERIOD
For section 1237 to apply, the taxpayer must have held the
"lot or parcel" for a period of five years before selling it.70
While on its face the statute could be interpreted as meaning
that after subdividing his tract the taxpayer must then hold the
resulting lot or parcel for five years,7 1 the Regulations make
it clear that the taxpayer must merely have "owned" the prop-
erty for the requisite five years."2
No holding period is required if the property is "acquired
by inheritance or devise";73 neither the beneficiary selling the
parcels nor the decedent from whom the property was acquired
68. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A284 (1954); S. REP.
No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954).
69. See text accompanying notes 79-87 infra. That this penalty
may indeed be theoretical seems quite evident. A taxpayer faced with
having to subdivide his tract into more than five lots or parcels to
achieve optimal marketability would be penalized by the five percent or-
dinary income rule of section 1237 only if his selling expenses were rela-
tively low in comparison to the magnitude of the sales. See text accom-
panying notes 87-92 infra. And, of course, the taxpayer would have to
weigh the disadvantage of paying a limited amount of tax at ordinary
rates against the necessity of selling more than five lots to capitalize on
favorable market conditions.
70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (3). The holding period is
computed by excluding the first and including the last day. Harriet M.
Hooper, 26 B.T.A. 758 (1932); Rev. Rul. 66-5, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 91.
71. See INT. Ruv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (3).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(a) (5) (1957).
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (3). Compare this statutory
rule to the prior case law under which gain from the sale of inherited
land that subsequently had been subdivided was rarely treated as ordi-
nary income. See, e.g., Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955).
[V7ol. 60:275
FAILURE OF SECTION 1237
is required to have held the property for five years.7 4 This
exception for property acquired by inheritance or devise is
inapplicable to property acquired through joint tenancy sur-
vivorship; 7 however, the survivor's holding period commences
as of the date on which the property was originally acquired.7 6
Since tacking of holding periods is permitted under the
general provisions of section 1223,57 the holding period of the
taxpayer would include that of the party from whom property
with a carried-over basis had been acquired.7 8
C. THE FIVE PERcENT ORDINARY INcOmE RULE
Assume that in year number 1, a calendar-year taxpayer
paid $44,000 for a 10 acre tract of unimproved land and com-
menced holding it as an investment. After holding it for five
years, in the sixth year he subdivided the tract into 10 one-
acre building sites and constructed some gravel roads. He then
advertised the lots and sold five of them, each to different
individuals for $15,000 cash. Assume further that his cost basis
for each lot sold was $4400 and his selling expenses, including
legal fees and real estate commissions, amounted to $600 per lot.
Thus the taxpayer would realize a taxable gain on each lot of
$10,000.7 9
Provided that all requirements of section 1237 are met, the
taxpayer will be entitled to full capital gains treatment if he sells
74. The beneficiary would have to hold the property for longer than
six months in order to qualify for long-term capital gains treatment un-
der section 1222(3), however. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(d) (2) (1957).
75. Id. This provision is consistent with the general rule that the
interest of a surviving joint tenant is not acquired by bequest, devise,
or inheritance. The theory is that, subject to the rights of other joint
tenants, the survivor owns all of the property from the beginning of thejoint tenancy. See C. Sirm & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF T=E LAW OF PRoP-
may 56 (2d ed. 1971). The Regulations also provide that for purposes
of section 1237 the survivor's one-half of community property is not to
be regarded as property acquired by devise or inheritance. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1237-1(d) (2) (1957).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(d) (2) (1957).
77. Id. § 1.1237-1(d) (1).
78. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1223(2), 1015(a). Thus a gift of
property from a mother to her daughter would not start the five-year
holding period running anew. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(d) (1) ex. (1)(1957). But improvements made by the mother while she held the land
would be attributed to the daughter, possibly nullifying application of
section 1237. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2) (A); text accom-
panying notes 122-27 infra.
79. $15,000 amount received offset by selling expenses of $600 less
$4400 adjusted basis equals $10,000 gain realized on each lot. INT. REv.
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no more than five lots during the sixth taxable year.80 If
he sold a sixth lot during that year, however, this advantage
would be diminished, since the sale would trigger the five percent
ordinary income rule of section 1237.81 Under that rule, gain
from the sale of any lot in or after the taxable year in which
the sixth lot is sold is taxable as ordinary income to the extent
of five percent of the selling price, with the remainder treated
as capital gain.
If, for example, the taxpayer in the sixth year sells six
lots instead of five, the five percent ordinary income rule will
apply to all six lots. To compute tax liability for each lot, the
taxpayer would commence by calculating the excess of $15,000
selling price over the $4400 cost basis-10,600. He would then
calculate five percent of the selling price--$750. Of the $10,600
gain, then, the amount by which $750 exceeds the $600 selling
expense82 would be characterized as ordinary income; the
remainder of the gain would be characterized as capital gain.
Thus the taxpayer would realize taxable ordinary income of $150
($750-$600) per lot and capital gain of $9,9850 ($10,600-$750).83 If,
however, instead of $600, the taxpayer's selling expenses per lot
were $1000, his potential taxable ordinary income would be com-
pletely offset and the $250 excess would be applied to reduce
the amount of capital gain realized from the sale to $9600
(($10,600-$750) -$250).84
CoDE oF 1954, § 1001. For cases dealing with selling expenses, see Lu-
cien Jouvand, 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1770 (1942) (legal fees); E. A. Grif-
fin, 19 B.T.A. 1243 (1930) (brokerage commissions); L. Metzger, 5
B.T.A. 1230 (1927) (brokerage fees).
80. In computing the number of lots sold, a sale of two or more con-
tiguous lots to one buyer is counted as only one sale. Treas. Reg. § 1.-
1237-1(e) (2) (1957).
81. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237(b) (1).
82. Id. § 1237(b) (2).
83. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (e) (2) (ii) & ex. (2) (1957).
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237(b) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1
(e) (2) (ii) ex. 1 (1957). Thus the effect of excess selling expense is
to reduce the amount of the taxpayer's capital gain, while that part
of selling expense deducted from five percent of the selling price es-
sentially is a deduction from ordinary income. The five percent ordi-
nary income rule operates only to characterize some of the taxpay-
er's gain as ordinary income; it does not affect the overall amount of
taxable gain. The Regulations provide that the five percent ordinary
income gain is to be excluded from the gain recognized on the sale
of each lot up to the amount of selling expenses. Id. By contrast, it ap-
pears that Congress intended the five percent to be included in the tax-
payer's gross income and the selling expenses, up to the same five per-
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On the other hand, if after selling five lots in his first year
of 1237 eligibility, the taxpayer sells lot 6 in the following tax-
able year, the full capital gains treatment afforded the first five
lots would be unaffected; however, the five percent ordinary
income rule would apply to the sixth sale and all subsequent
sales.85 But if the taxpayer abstains from making any addi-
tional sales for a period of five years, he may then treat the
remaining lots as a "new" tract and repeat the section 1237
process, selling up to five lots at full capital gains treatment.86
Thus, while section 1237 may provide for capital gains
treatment even though a taxpayer subdivided his property and
sold several lots, the statute imposes a penalty for selling too
many lots too soon. This penalty is a statutory reflection of prior
cases in which courts had viewed volume and frequency of sales
as factors pointing toward dealership classification.87 But even
if it is assumed that some penalty is appropriate, the five per-
cent ordinary income rule of section 1237 fails to serve that pur-
pose. By permitting deduction of selling expenses from five
percent of the selling price, often little or no ordinary income
will be recognized. For example, the payment of a five percent
sales commission alone will wipe out the effect of the five per-
cent ordinary income rule, resulting in taxation of the gain at
only capital gain rates and, moreover, reducing that gain by five
percent of the selling price.88
While commissions charged for the sale of land rarely fall
below five percent of the selling price and often range upward
to 10 percent,8 9 Congress, in formulating the five percent or-
dinary income rule, apparently assumed that a five percent
commission was the norm.90 The theory is that if the taxpayer
cent of selling price, to be deducted from that gross amount. H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A283 (1954).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (e) (2) (ii) (1957).
86. Section 1237(a) of the Code covers "[a]ny lot or parcel which
is part of a tract of real property in the hands of a taxpayer" provided
that under section 1237 (a) (3) the lot or parcel in question has been held
for five years. In defining "tract," section 1237 (c) provides:
If, following the sale or exchange of any lot or parcel from a
tract of real property, no further sales or exchanges of any other
lots or parcels from the remainder of such tract are made for a
period of 5 years, such remainder shall be deemed a tract.
87. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
88. See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Rogers, Compensation of the Georgia Real Estate
Broker, 6 GA. L. Rnv. 375, 388-89 n.67 (1972).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A283 (1954). The
five percent figure may have been realistic in 1954.
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sells a parcel without the assistance of a broker, he will "earn"
the five percent commission for himself,91 which will be taxed
as ordinary income92 if he sells too many parcels too soon. The
statutory approach is therefore resigned to treat that portion of
gain attributable to the taxpayer's own selling efforts as ordinary
income, just as a sales commission would be treated if earned
by a broker.
While explainable in theory, the five percent ordinary
income rule has failed dismally in practice. It requires a complex
mechanical computation that, after selling expenses are deducted
from what would otherwise be ordinary income, will often result
in little or no additional tax being levied against the taxpayer.
Hence the rule serves neither as an effective means of raising
revenue nor as an inhibition on the dealer-like activities of those
who engage in frequent and high volume sales.
D. SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEIMNT OF THE TRAcT
To satisfy the substantial improvement requirement of
section 1237, the taxpayer must meet a two-fold test: he must
not have made substantial improvements to the tract that sub-
stantially enhance the value of the lots sold.93
Under prior case law, a taxpayer was almost invariably
classified as a dealer and subjected to taxation at ordinary rates
after subdividing and selling property on which he had made
improvements. 94 Section 1237 was intended to provide relief to
the subdividing taxpayer by permitting him to make some
improvements to his tract so long as they were not "substan-
tial."95 The effect of this limitation has been to prevent
taxpayers from receiving capital gain treatment on profits aris-
ing from the "sale" of the improvements rather than from long-
term appreciation of the land itself.90
While the statute fails to define "substantial," examples of
both substantial and insubstantial improvements are provided
91. See, e.g., George E. Bailey, 41 T.C. 663 (1964) (life insurance
agent entitled to 50 percent commission on policy sales remitted a net
premium of $257.40 for policy purchased on his own life; balance of the
$514.80 full premium held to be ordinary income to the agent even
though not actually paid out as a commission by the company).
92. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (1).
93. Id. § 1237(a) (2).
94. See, e.g., DiLisio v. Vidal, 233 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1956); Friend
v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952); McFaddin v. Commis-
sioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A285 (1954); S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 442 (1954).
96. See text accompanying note 182 infra.
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in the Regulations.97 The improvements that the taxpayer may
make are: building a temporary office, surveying, filling, drain-
ing, leveling, clearing, and installing minimum all-weather access
roads.9 8 The list of forbidden improvements includes: con-
structing shopping centers or other commercial or residential
buildings, and installing hard surface roads or utilities such as
sewer, water, gas, or electric lines.99 Both this list'00 and the
list of improvements permitted as insubstantial' 01 are intended
to be illustrative but not exclusive. Thus the taxpayer who
makes an "unlisted" improvement necessarily proceeds with
some uncertainty, since it is difficult to draw with any precision
a line between an improvement that is "substantial'' 0 2 and one
that is "minor."'10 3
Moreover, even where an item does appear on one of the
two lists, basic weaknesses inhere in such categorical predeter-
minations of the character of certain improvements. For ex-
ample, because installation of a "permitted" improvement does
not technically constitute substantial improvement to the tract,
97. The examples are derived generally from the Senate and House
Reports cited in note 95 supra.
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (4) (1957). The Regulation also pro-
vides that the roads may not be hard surfaced, but that they may be
equal in quality to gravel roads if required by the climate. Moreover,
legislative history indicates that such roads may be built "to each lot
sold." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A285 (1954).
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (4) (1957).
100. "Among the improvements considered substantial are ......
Id. (emphasis added). The Senate Report refers to only shopping centers
and utilities as examples. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 442
(1954).
101. Although the Regulation can be read as making the permissible
list exclusive, legislative history suggests otherwise. The House Report
states that "[t]he permissible improvements include, but are not limited
to, clearing operations and the construction of minimum all-weather ac-
cess roads to each lot." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A285
(1954).
102. That the use of the word "substantial" causes the courts some
difficulty in construing this section is evidenced in Robert W. Pointer,
48 T.C. 906, 915 (1967), affd on other grounds, 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir.
1969), where the Tax Court stated:
'Substantial' is an elusive word. It refers to that which is large,
valuable, or noteworthy, or in a negative sense, to that which is
not trivial, nominal, or incomplete.
103. The Senate Report states that
the use of the word substantial was intended to permit the
taxpayer to make certain improvements without losing the bene-
fits of this section if either the improvements were minor or they
resulted in but slight enhancement of the value of the lots sold
from the tract.
S. Rtp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 442 (1954).
1976]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the taxpayer apparently will not be disqualified from section
1237 treatment regardless of how much that particular improve-
ment enhances the value of the lots that are sold.104 While
the permissible activities of filling and draining a high and dry
tract may cost little and cause only a small increase in value,
the same improvements to poorly drained land will typically
cost very much and greatly enhance the value of the property;
yet both situations will qualify under section 1237.
These predetermined lists of permissible and impermissible
improvements should, of course, promote taxpayer reliance and
judicial economy, at least with respect to the listed items.105
But considering their shortcomings, perhaps a better (or sup-
plemental) approach would be that suggested by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Commissioner.10 6 In
that case, the court ignored the lists in the Regulations and
instead held that the taxpayer's improvements were substantial
because they cost more than 12 times the acquisition cost of
the land on which they were made. This method of comparing
the taxpayer's cost basis in the property with the cost of the
improvements might be less than satisfactory, however, where
inflation injects artificiality into a comparison of the present high
cost of improvements with an earlier low cost of land acquisition.
An alternative method of arriving at an appropriate measure
of substantiality would be to compare the current market value
of the tract with the cost of the currently installed improve-
ments; the two factors thus would be drawn from the same
104. "Improvements which are not substantial in and of themselves,
although resulting in a substantial increase in the value of the lots of the
tract . . . are intended to be permitted." Id. A literal reading of the
statute supports this result. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2).
105. Utilizing the lists in their deliberations regarding section 1237,
the courts have applied a uniform approach only in unanimously ruling
against the taxpayer. Holding that the "no substantial improvement" re-
quirement was fatally violated, some courts have cited both the substan-
tial and insubstantial lists. Hvidsten v. United States, 185 F. Supp.
856, 860-61 (D.N.D. 1960) (taxpayer constructed four residences);
Robert W. Pointer, 48 T.C. 906, 914 (1967), aff'd on other grounds, 419
F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969) (taxpayer paved street and installed utilities).
Another court cited only construction of residences. Estate of Peter
Finder, 37 T.C. 411, 421 (1961). Another court failed to cite either list,
but narrowly applied the listed item of road construction against the tax-
payer, finding that minimum all-weather "access" roads were not access
roads but main streets. Revell v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas.
84,060, 84,062-63, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 877, 880 (D.S.C. 1972).
106. 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960).
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economic context. But this method would be inequitable since
a taxpayer whose property had greatly appreciated not only
would realize a larger profit, but would also be able to make
more improvements than would a taxpayer whose property had
not appreciated as much.
E. SUBSTANTIAL ENHANCEmENT OF THE LOT VALUE
Even though the taxpayer has made "substantial improve-
ments" to his tract, the benefits of section 1237 are still available
if those improvements have not substantially enhanced the value
of the lot sold.10 7 Accordingly, if the taxpayer makes a sub-
stantial improvement to lot 1 but sells lots 4 and 5, and if the
improvement to lot I does not substantially enhance the value
of lots 4 and 5, those lots are eligible for section 1237 treat-
ment. 08 There are two logical steps in making this determina-
tion: (1) How much is the value of the lot increased? and (2)
is this increase substantial?
1. Measuring the Amount of Enchancement
The approach set forth in the Regulations is to measure the
increase as the difference between the improved value of the lot
and its value had the improvement not been made.10 9 Applying
this test, the Tax Court in Robert W. Pointer'" found that an
increment of $2500 to $3000, attributable solely to improvements
which doubled the value of the unimproved lots, constituted sub-
stantial enhancement in value.
The Regulations provide that enhancement is to be measured
as of the date by which the improvements were completed and
that changes in value arising from factors other than improve-
ments made by the seller are to be ignored."' From a
practical standpoint, this formula could become extremely com-
107. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2).
108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (3) (iii) (1957). The example ap-
pearing in the Senate Report is that of a taxpayer who builds his own
residence on one of the lots in the tract. It is suggested that this substan-
tial improvement may increase the salability of the other lots, but it
probably would not substantially enhance their value. S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 442 (1954). A better, less questionable, example is
that of erecting a barn, included in the House Report. See H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A285 (1954).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (3) (i) (1957).
110. 48 T.C. 906 (1967), affd on other grounds, 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir.
1969).
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (3) (i) (1957).
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plex and difficult to apply. Consider, for example, the taxpayer
who makes several improvements to his land, each completed on
a different date, and who must calculate enhancement when land
values generally are declining while at the same time land values
in the taxpayer's suburban area are rising because of a soon-
to-be-constructed high-speed rail line running into the city.
112
A simpler approach, but questionable in light of the Regu-
lations, is that suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v.
Commissioner; drawing on the standard that it developed to
measure the substantiality of the improvement, the court as-
serted that an inference of enhancement might be drawn by com-
paring the cost of the improvement with the acquisition cost of the
land.11.3 But besides leading to an artificial conclusion where
the land had been acquired at low cost, this approach seems to
miss the mark statutorily since it focuses on the substantiality
of the improvement made on the tract rather than the substan-
tiality of the enhancement of the value of the lot.11 4 It is possible
that very costly improvements could be made on a tract without
significantly increasing the value of the lot." 5  Thus, despite
difficulty of application under some circumstances, the approach
of the Regulations, calculating that portion of the present market
value of a lot that is attributable to improvement of the tract,
seems to reflect most accurately the measure of enhancement.
2. What is Substantial Enhancement
If it is determined that improvements to the tract have
enhanced the value of a lot, a further question arises as to
whether the incremental value is substantial within the meaning
of section 1237. The statute fails to define "substantial enhance-
ment," and the legislative history affords little guidance other
than the statement that the question is one of fact in each case
and that "slight" enhancement might be permissible." 6
112. For consideration of the difficulty of proving changes in value,
see note 120 infra and accompanying text.
113. 218 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1960). The court did not have to spe-
cifically reach the issue of measurement, however, since the seller failed
to sustain his burden of establishing that his substantial improvements
did not substantially enhance the value of the lots.
114. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
115. Certain improvements may in fact diminish the value of some
lots. Consider, for example, how installation of a firing range on part
of the tract would affect the value of nearby residential lots.
116. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 442 (1954).
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The Regulations provide that improvements to the tract
enhancing the value of the lots sold by 10 percent or less do
not constitute substantial enhancement; but if they enhance the
value by more than 10 percent, all relevant factors must be con-
sidered in determining whether the enhancement is substan-
tial.1 7 The taxpayer thus has a clear guideline to the extent
that he remains within the 10 percent limitation; if his activities
result in value enhancement exceeding that percentage, however,
the guideline becomes blurred. For example, where a taxpayer
had made substantial improvements by constructing paved roads,
and as a result the value of certain frontage lots increased by
12 and one-half percent, a district court concluded that section
1237 was unavailable." 8
Apparently, the taxpayer has never prevailed in a case in
which "substantial enhancement" was at issue.1 9 Once a sub-
stantial improvement to the tract was found, in no case has the
taxpayer been able to sustain the burden of proving that the val-
ue of the lot sold had not been substantially enhanced. 20 The
courts have tended to intermingle the two issues-improvement
and enhancement12 1-and their confusion has denied the tax-
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (3) (ii) (1957).
118. Revell v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,060, 29 Am. Fed.
Tax. R. 2d 877 (D.S.C. 1972).
119. See, e.g., Kelley v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960)
(amount of enhancement undetermined); Revell v. United States, 72-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 84,060, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 877 (D.S.C. 1972) (12Y2
percent enhancement); Robert W. Pointer, 48 T.C. 906 (1967), aff'd on
other grounds, 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969) (100 percent enhancement).
120. In order to meet this difficult burden of proof, the taxpayer
planning a substantial improvement to his tract but wishing to qualify
the subsequent sale of some of his lots under section 1237 should consider
obtaining an independent appraisal of the value of the lots both before
and after making the improvement.
121. In Hvidsten v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 856, 863 (D.N.D.
1960), the court reasoned that because the building of residences on the
tract was found to be substantial,
[t]he only fair and reasonable conclusion is that such construc-
tion was for the purpose of increasing and would and did in-
crease the sale of other lots in the tract by increasing their de-
sirability and marketability from a residential standpoint, which
factor would of necessity enhance and affect market value. It
is beyond dispute that such improvements were substantial and
in the court's opinion, from the evidence, such improvements
substantially increased the value of the remaining lots thereafter
sold.
No figures or other concrete evidence were included in the opinion. See
also Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960); Revell v.
United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,060, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 877
(D.S.C. 1972).
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payer most of the benefit that the distinct two-part test of the
statute should provide.
F. ATmmTBUTIoN OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPRoVEMEmTs
A taxpayer cannot protect his eligibility to utilize section
1237 merely by refraining from malting substantial improvements
to a tract of land, since the actions of another person may be
attributed to him. For purposes ol section 1237, a taxpayer will
be deemed to have made improvements if they are made by
certain specified parties or if they are made under a contract
of sale. In addition, improvements made by an agent probably
would be attributed to the taxpayer.
1. Improvements by Specified Parties
Under section 1237 the taxpayer will be deemed to have made
improvements if they are made by certain members of his
family: a spouse, whole or half brothers and sisters, ancestors,
or lineal descendants. 1 22  Assume. for example, that the tax-
payer's father, having held a tract of land for two years,
subdivides it and makes substantial improvements that substan-
tially enhance the value of the resultant lots. He then gives
the tract to the taxpayer, who does nothing to it and sells it
after four years. The taxpayer will be deemed to have made
the improvements made by his father during the initial two-year
period and therefore will be ineligible for section 1237 treat-
ment.123 On the other hand, had the father made no improve-
ments, the taxpayer could qualify under section 1237 since he
would have satisfied the five-year holding requirement of the
statute.12 4 The taxpayer tacks to his holding period the two
years that his father held the property, not by virtue of the
family attribution rules, which are inapplicable when calculating
the holding period of real property, 25 but rather because he
is a donee with a carry-over basis; 26 hence he will be treated
as having held the property for a total of six years.127
122. INT. Ray. CoDE OF 1954, § 1237(a) (2) (A). Compare id. § 318(a)
(1) (attribution of stock ownership to spouse, children, grandchildren,
and parents).
123. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (2) (ii) ex. (1957).
124. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (d)
(1) (1957).
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(b) (3) (1957).
126. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015.
127. Id. § 1223 (2). See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
Moreover, if his father were a real estate dealer, that status would
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In addition to improvements made by members of the tax-
payer's family, the statute specifies that those made by the fol-
lowing parties will be deemed to have been made by the taxpayer:
a corporation con-rolled by the taxpayer;128 a partnership of
which the taxpayer was a member at the time the improvements
were made; 29 the government, if the improvement constitutes
an addition to the taxpayer's cost basis in the property; 130 and
a lessee, if the improvement constitutes income to the tax-
payer.' 3 '
Improvements made by lessees present a special case. If
such an improvement is made as a rental payment, it not only
will be treated as income to the taxpayer,132 but it also will
be regarded as having been made by him. 33 Conversely, even
a substantial improvement made by a lessee will not nullify
section 1237 provided it does not constitute payment of rent.134
Whether an improvement will be regarded as a rental payment
depends on the intent of the parties;135 thus an improvement
be attributed to the taxpayer to defeat his use of section 1237 even
though his father had made no improvements to the tract. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1237-1(b) (3) ex. (1957). There is no statutory basis for this exten-
sion of the attribution rules of the "substantial improvements" subsection
to the "dealer" subsection of the statute, however; and in the case of a
bona fide gift to a nondealer child, it produces an unfair result.
128. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2) (A). Control is defined as
"direct ownership, constructive ownership, or otherwise, of more than 50
percent of the corporation's voting stock." Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (2)
(i) (b) (1957). For other statutory definitions of control, compare INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 267(b) (more than 50 percent), § 368(c) (at least
80 percent), and § 1239 (more than 80 percent).
129. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2) (A). With respect to part-
nerships, neither the Code nor the Regulations specify any particular per-
centage of ownership. Thus membership appears to be all that is neces-
sary.
130. Id. § 1237 (a) (2) (C). "Government" includes federal, state, or
local government, or any political subdivision thereof. Here the tax-
payer may lose eligibility for section 1237 because of circumstances
over which he has no control. If, for example, the municipality con-
structed a paved street on the taxpayer's property and assessed him
the cost, such improvement would increase his basis and would be
attributed to him under section 1237. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(c) (2)
(i) (e) (1957).
131. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2) (B).
132. Id. § 61(a) (5).
133. IU § 1237(a) (2) (B).
134. Id. § 109. The taxpayer's basis in the property must not be ad-
justed, however. Id. § 1019.
rental income to the lessor in a particular case depends upon the
intention of the parties, which may be indicated either by the
135. Whether or not improvements made by a lessee result in
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made by a volunteer or a trespasser clearly would not be attrib-
uted to the taxpayer. And a lessee conceivably might enter into
a term ground lease of part of a subdivided tract and construct
a large shopping center that would substantially enhance the
value of the remaining parcels; yet this improvement would not
be attributed to the taxpayer if it were not intended as rent. 36
2. Contract Attribution
Improvements made by the purchaser of a lot also may be
charged back to the taxpayer since the Code covers not only the
improvements made by the taxpayer while he holds the tract
but also those "made pursuant to a contract of sale entered into
between the taxpayer and the buyer.' 187 While the language
of the Code is unclear, the Regulations provide that this rule
covers improvements made by either the taxpayer or the
buyer.13 8
The Commissioner goes further, however, taking the position
that section 1237 is unavailable if the taxpayer enters into a con-
tract of sale that merely obligates either the taxpayer or the
buyer to make substantial improvements that substantially
enhance the value of the lot. 39 The taxpayer may escape this
result, however, if the obligation ceases within the period of time
during which he may file for a refund of the tax paid on the gain
from the sale of the lot.' 40  In effect, he can retroactively
qualify for section 1237 merely by filing an amended return for
the year of sale.' 41
What does the Commissioner's position mean? Assume that
the taxpayer sells a lot and the contract of sale obligates either
the taxpayer or the buyer to make "forbidden" improve-
ments. 42  According to the Regulations, if the obligation re-
mains in force for three or more years, the taxpayer will be
unable to avail himself of section 1237 even though the improve-
terms of the lease or by the surrounding circumstances.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8 (c) (1957). See Grace H. Cunningham, 28 T.C. 670(1957).
136. Assuming, of course, that no other relationship between the tax-
payer and the lessee supported attribution of the lessee's improvements.
See notes 122-30 supra and accompanying text.
137. INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2).
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(c) (2) (iii) (1957).
139. Id. § 1.1237-1(c) (2) (iii) (a).
140. Id.
141. Id. ex.
142. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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ments are never made. Inasmuch as the Code specifies improve-
ments "made" pursuant to a contract, 43 by including unfulfilled
obligations the Commissioner may have gone too far.144
Moreover, this retroactive approach of the Regulations is
predicated on the taxpayer otherwise fully qualifying for sec-
tion 1237 in the year of the sale in question.1 45  Where this
is indeed the case and the taxpayer has sold a lot to an
unrelated purchaser, section 1237 would very likely be irrelevant,
since the taxpayer otherwise qualifying under section 1237 prob-
ably would qualify for full capital gains treatment under section
1221(1) as well. For example, in cases decided before the enact-
ment of section 1237, taxpayers received capital gains treatment
despite selling to unrelated purchasers who agreed to build on
the property and pay off the taxpayers upon selling the build-
ings. 40  And early predictions notwithstanding, 47 section
1237 has failed to change this result. 4
According to the Regulations, an improvements contract is
permissible if it merely restricts the improvements that either
party may make. 49 Assume that the contract prohibits the
buyer from building any structure on his lot unless it is a resi-
dence costing more than $30,000. Even though the buyer may
in fact build such a residence, he was under no "obligation" to
make any improvements, and section 1237 would still apply. 50
3. Agency Attribution
Under the contract rule, improvements made by others will
not be attributed to the taxpayer if there is no contract of
sale,' 5 ' nor will they under the specified party rule, absent one of
143. INT. Pray. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (2).
144. On the other hand, the parties have, in effect, contracted to vio-
late the requirements of section 1237, and the Commissioner's rule does
provide the taxpayer three years within which to return to compliance.
145. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1237-1(c) (1), (2) (ii) (1957).
146. See, e.g., Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947); Boom-
hower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
147. See Levin, Capital Gains or Income Tax on Real Estate Sales,
37 BosToN U.L. Rnv. 165, 205 (1957).
148. See, e.g., Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964);
Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958); Houghten v.
United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,872, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1099(W.D. Mich. 1963); Schuhmacher v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
68,075, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1329 (S.D. Tex. 1958).
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1(c) (2) (iii) (b) (1957).
150. Id.
151. See text accompanying notes 137-50 supra.
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the statutory relationships. 152 Does it necessarily follow that
improvements made by persons not enumerated in the statute
and not under a sales contract will escape attribution to the tax-
payer? It would appear so from the Regulations.' 53  Clearly
falling into this category are improvements made by mere volun-
teers or trespassers.15 4 Uncertainty arises, however, in situa-
tions where the taxpayer engages another to make improve-
ments. Here the basic questions are whether the other person
will be deemed the taxpayer's agent and whether his improve-
ments will be attributed to the taxpayer. 55  The problem
might arise in the following context.
After subdividing a tract of land, the taxpayer contracts with
a developer to construct houses on each lot and to advertise and
sell them as packages. He approves and finances the construction
and passes title to the ultimate purchaser as the developer sells
each residential package. The developer obviously has made sub-
stantial improvements, 56 and if they are attributed to the tax-
payer, he cannot utilize section 1237.157 Under these circum-
stances, the significant degree to which the taxpayer controls the
developer is doubtless sufficient to constitute an agency relation-
ship such that the taxpayer simply will be considered to have
made the improvements himself.15
But closer cases may arise. Assume that a taxpayer engages
a real estate broker, grants him broad powers, but retains
title to the land and the right to control its ultimate disposition.
The broker then subdivides, substantially improves, advertises,
152. See text accompanying notes 122-36 supra.
153. "Improvements made by a bona fide lessee (other than as rent)
or by others not described in section 1237 (a) (2) do not preclude the use
of section 1237." Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (c) (2) (iv) (1957).
154. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 442-43 (1954).
155. This determination would necessarily have to be made in light
of the federal case law that has evolved under the Internal Revenue Code
rather than in strict accordance with agency doctrine that has evolved as
a matter of state law. See, e.g., cases cited in note 148 supra.
156. See Estate of Peter Finder, 37 T.C. 411 (1961); Treas. Reg. § 1.-
1237-1 (c) (4) (1957).
157. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
158. In a similar situation, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer him-
self made substantial improvements. It did not bother to discuss how
the improvements were imputed to the taxpayer for purposes of section
1237, however. Rather, it turned to section 1221 (1), considered whether
the developer's activities should be attributed to the taxpayer for pur-
poses of that section, and concluded that they should be. Robert W.
Pointer, 48 T.C. 906 (1967), aft'd 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969).
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and sells the lots, reimbursing himself out of the sale proceeds
for the costs of development. The taxpayer did not finance
or participate in subdividing and developing the tract and never
exercised his retained right to control. His only direct involve-
ment was merely to execute deeds to buyers. In a section 1221 (1)
case in which the taxpayer's investor status was at issue, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that under such
circumstances the broker was carrying on his own business and
that his activities could not be imputed to the taxpayer.15 9
Thus, if the taxpayer grants full control over his property to
a developer and remains passive except for signing conveyances,
there is a chance that the activities of the developer, including
improvements that he makes, will not be attributed to the
taxpayer.160
159. Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964) (relying
heavily on Estate of William Mundy, 36 T.C. 703 (1961), and Smith v.
Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955)). The right to control an agent should
result in attribution. Thus the Seventh Circuit in Voss seems to be incor-
rect in excluding attribution on the ground that while the taxpayer had
the right to control the developer he did not, in fact, exercise that right.
Moreover, the Voss decision is conceptually inconsistent with the Regula-
tions, which provide that the mere existence of a contractual obligation
by the buyer to make improvements may be charged to the taxpayer
even where no improvements are made. See text accompanying notes
137-44 supra.
160. But even to have this chance, the taxpayer must remain very
passive; even slight activity and the developer will be considered the
taxpayer's agent. See, e.g., Robert L. Hamilton, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
463 (1974) (applicability of Voss and Mundy denied).
Moreover, it should be noted that this analysis is based not on cases
involving the attribution of improvement issue under section 1237 (a) (2),
but rather on cases arising under section 1221 (1) in which the taxpayer's
dealership status has been determined, that is, whether he held property
"for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
And since the underlying question with respect to improvement attribu-
tion is merely one of agency and control, the section 1221 (1) cases are
only applicable indirectly; they focus on a broader issue encompassing
many additional factors. Typically in those cases, the developer's activi-
ties were but one indication of the taxpayer's status as a dealer. Other
factors, such as how the property was acquired, whether the taxpayer
could dispose of the property without making improvements, and other
sales activity, were also considered by the courts in making this determi-
nation. Thus the weight ultimately ascribed to attribution in those cases
has depended on whether attributed activities plus all other factors
taken together led to dealer classification. See Voss v. United States, 329
F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964); Lunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir.
1958); Achong v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1957); Smith v.
Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315 (5th
Cir. 1947); Houghten v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,872, 11 Am.
Fed. Tax. R. 2d 1099 (W.D. Mich. 1963); Johnson v. United States, 188
F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Calif. 1960); Schuhmacher v. United States, 58-1 U.S.




If, after subdividing, the taxpayer holds the lots or parcels
for a period of 10 years and meets certain other conditions, he
may make some substantial improvements that substantially
enhance the value of the lots sold and yet still qualify for section
1237 treatment.' 61 Permissible improvements include building
or installing facilities such as water, sewer, drainage, and
roads. 62 The taxpayer must establish that without such
improvements the lots that were sold would not have been mar-
ketable at the prevailing local price for similar real estate. 63 He
also must elect not to increase his basis to reflect the expendi-
tures for such improvements, nor may he deduct the expendi-
tures from his ordinary income. 6 4
Apparently, no court has decided a case involving this
provision of the statute. This is so probably because of the dif-
ficulty the taxpayer would face in satisfying the detailed require-
ments of the Regulations, such as furnishing the IRS the selling
price of comparable real estate in the vicinity of his property.0 1
L. Hamilton, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 463 (1974); Estate of William Mundy,
36 T.C. 703 (1961).
The requirement of section 1221 (1) that the taxpayer must not be a
dealer is also the threshold requirement of section 1237, except that under
the latter section the taxpayer's subdividing and selling activities under
certain circumstances may be ignored. See text accompanying notes 39-
48 supra. Suppose, for example, that the taxpayer has engaged directly
in subdividing and selling activities but that a developer has installed
improvements and it is unclear whether he is an agent of the taxpayer
or an independent contractor. Assume further that the improvements,
even if charged against the taxpayer, would be insufficient when taken
alone to result in dealer classification under section 1221 (1), but that the
taxpayer's subdividing and selling activities do lead to such a result un-
der that section. The issue of whether improvements made by the devel-
oper will be attributed to the taxpayer is brought clearly into focus when
the taxpayer attempts to qualify under section 1237.
161. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 1237(b) (3) (added by Senate Floor
Amendment, 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5331). The taxpayer
must hold the property for 10 years even if he inherited it. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1237-1(c) (5) (i) (a) (1957).
162. Treas. leg. § 1.1237-1(c) (5) (i) (b) (1957).
163. Id. § 1.1237-1(c) (5) (i) (c). How difficult may it be to convince
the IRS that the taxpayer should receive capital gains treatment?
164. Id. § 1.1237-1(c) (5) (i) (d).
165. Id. § 1.1237-1(c) (5) (ii); see id. § 1.1237-1(c) (5) (iii). It is
clear that section 1237 would have little impact on the decision of a
subdividing taxpayer to make substantial improvements when he can
earn a greater profit, even after paying taxes on ordinary income, by
making the improvements forbidden by the section. Assume, for ex-
ample, that a taxpayer in the 50 percent bracket holds a tract of land that
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III. SECTION 1237 IMPACT ON CASE LAW
While recognizing that its stringent requirements preclude
frequent application, some commentators have suggested that
section 1237 could provide persuasive authority for limiting
the scope of judicial inquiry into subdividing and sales activity
in providing guidelines for characterization of assets as capital
or ordinary under section 1221 (1).166 Since the courts appar-
ently have felt no compulsion to limit the weight ascribed to
subdividing and sales activities when making such determina-
tions, however, section 1237 has had little, if any, impact. 67
In the case law that developed under the 1939 Code, the
courts regarded subdividing as inconclusive, but substantial,
evidence that the taxpayer was in the real estate business and
therefore was a dealer. 6 8 Congress was probably aware of the
he has subdivided. Assume further that the cost basis of each lot is $2000
and that the fair market value of each is $3000. If the taxpayer has qual-
ified under section 1237, his gain from the sale of one lot will be $1000,
his tax liability (at capital gains rates) will be $250, and his net profit
will be $750. Assume, alternatively, that before selling any lots, the tax-
payer clears, grades, and surveys his subdivided tract and then constructs
gravel roads, water lines, and sewers, all at a cost of $1000 per lot, in-
creasing the cost basis of each to $3000 and the fair market value to $6000
per lot. Here the taxpayer's gain will be $3000 and his tax liability (at
ordinary income rates) will be $1500, for a net profit of $1500. Hence
a taxpayer seeking to maximize his profit would most assuredly elect to
make the forbidden improvements. Moreover, in many areas, local ordi-
nances do not permit subdivision unless the taxpayer agrees to make cer-
tain improvements, such as constructing paved roads or installing utili-
ties, see J. DELAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 69-70(2d ed. 1969), which may exceed the maximum improvements permitted
under section 1237. See text accompanying notes 93-104 supra.
In some areas, however, concern for the environment has been re-
flected in zoning ordinances that, instead of requiring substantial im-
provements, require the builder to minimize the impact of improvements
on the environment. See generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HomE
BUILDERS, LAND DEVELOPMENT MANUAL 15-20 (1969). Such zoning law
changes could make section 1237 available to some taxpayers for the first
time-particularly since more taxpayers would probably have attempted
to use section 1237 in the first place if, instead of imposing rather arbi-
trary limits on permissible improvements, the statute had been geared to
local zoning ordinances so that the taxpayer could still qualify under the
section by making the minimum improvements required for local sub-
division approval.
166. See Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real Estate--"Dealer" v. "In-
vestor" Problem, 11 TAx L. Rsv. 157 (1956); Note, Federal Income Taxa-
tion of Subdivided Realty-The Impact of Section 1237 on Capital Asset
Characterization, 31 IwD. L.J. 516 (1956).
167. See cases cited in note 173 infra; Primmer, Sales of Subdivided
Realty-Capital Gains v. Ordinary Income, 19 Sw. L.J. 116, 136-37 n.113
(1965).
168. See cases cited in note 36 supra; Emmanuel, Capital Gains for
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importance ascribed by the courts to these activities when it
enacted section 1237;169 but the cases suggest that except where
the taxpayer has specifically attempted to satisfy the strict re-
quirements of the statute, section 1237 has had little effect on
judicial attitudes toward subdividing and selling real estate.170
Inasmuch as the courts have continued to cite pre-section
1237 cases in resolving when subdividing activities will result in
ordinary gain,17' they apparently have concluded that, 1237
notwithstanding, the cases that evolved under section 117 (a) (1)
of the 1939 Code retain their vitality.172  Thus the courts,
when construing section 1221 (1), have continued to rely heavily
on subdividing and sales activity as important indications that
property is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business."' 3 The Commissioner has shared the disre-
Real Estate Operators, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 280, 287 (1959); Levin, Capital
Gains or Income Tax on Real Estate Sales, 37 BosToN U.L. REV. 165, 186-
87 (1957); Pennell, Capital Gains in Real Estate Transactions, TuLANE
8TH TAX INsT. 23, 55 (1959); Repetti, What Constitutes a Dealer Under
Section 1237, N.Y.U. 17TH INsT. oN FED. TAX. 651, 655 (1959). A rather
well-established exception to this rule has been the case of property ac-
quired by inheritance, which is usually afforded capital gains treatment.
See Schenger & Embry, Capital Gains Through Real Estate, 27 N. L.
REv. 19, 24 (1967).
169. See authorities cited in note 34 supra.
170. In the cases litigated under section 1237, no taxpayer has satis-
fied its strict requirements. See Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527(9th Cir. 1960); Revell v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,060, 29
Am. Fed. Tax. R. 2d 877 (D.S.C. 1972); Hvidsten v. United States, 185 F.
Supp. 856 (D.N.D. 1960); Robert W. Pointer, 48 T.C. 906 (1967), affd, 419
F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969); Estate of Peter Finder, 37 T.C. 411 (1961). It
is only because a taxpayer has attempted to apply the statute that the
courts have even recognized its potential effect. But in each case, the
courts, after rejecting specific application of section 1237, have returned
to the criteria established under sections 1221 and 1231 to characterize the
gain, ignoring any broader-intent of Congress in enacting section 1237.
171. See, e.g., Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960);
Nadalin v. United States, 364 F.2d 431 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Thomas W. Nevin,
34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 325 (1965); J.G. Mendoza, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 596
(1963).
172. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1), 53 Stat. 50 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1221 (1) ). See cases cited in note 33 supra.
173. See, e.g., Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969); Estate of Segel
v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1966); Coffey v. United States, 333
F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1964); Broughton v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 492 (6th
Cir. 1964); Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1958); Jean-
ese, Inc. v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Casalina
Corp., 60 T.C. 694 (1973). The importance of these two factors may have
been somewhat mitigated by the addition of other factors such as the
owner's primary occupation, his use of the property, and the percentage
of his income that he derives from the property. These additions are
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gard of the courts for any general legislative intent underlying
section 1237 by occasionally arguing that subdivision per se
indicates that the taxpayer is a dealer.274
The dearth of cases in which section 1237 has been so much
as cited suggests that neither courts nor attorneys have looked
to the statute as controlling or persuasive authority in resolving
or arguing subdivision cases. In some instances, section 1237 is
obviously inapplicable, the taxpayer having gone far beyond
its restrictive requirements. 1'7 5 But even where its burdensome
provisions have been arguably satisfied, the section has had no
perceptible impact whatsoever. 76 Thus the clear intent of Con-
gress to provide relief to those taxpayers who must subdivide
real estate in order to successfully liquidate their investment has
been ignored.177
At least one court, however, has been persuaded by the
policy underlying section 1237. In Estate of Barrios v. Commis-
sioner'7 8 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowl-
more likely attributable to the gradual complexity that inheres in the ev-
olution of judicial doctrine than to any effect of section 1237.
174. See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp.
1331 (W.D. La. 1973). The Commissioner has also taken the position that
a lack of subdividing activity is a strong indication that a particular
property is a capital asset. See Rev. Rul. 57-565, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 546.
175. See, e.g., Hansche v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969); Carruth v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Tex. 1957); Lewis v. United States,
389 F.2d 818 (Ct. Cl. 1968); S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966); J.G. Men-
doza, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 596 (1963).
176. See, e.g., Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964); Es-
tate of William Mundy, 36 T.C. 703 (1961); Wellesley A. Ayling, 32 T.C.
704 (1959); Mark B. Lloyd, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1970); Adolph
Dantagman, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 849 (1960).
177. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the fail-
ure to consider section 1237 is due in part to unfamiliarity, to its narrow
focus, or to the confusion as to its role in the dealer versus investor issue.
In some cases, section 1237 may have been intentionally ignored. For
cases where the taxpayer has subdivided his land and made substantial
improvements to the tract, as defined by section 1237, and yet was af-
forded capital gains treatment without reference to the section, see Es-
tate of Barrios v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959); Biedenharn
Realty v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1331 (D. La. 1973); Temple v. United
States, 229 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Miss. 1964); Oahu Sugar Co. v. United
States, 300 F.2d 773 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Lazarus v. United States, 172 F. Supp.
421 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Wellesley A. Ayling, 32 T.C. 704 (1959); Allen Moore,
30 T.C. 1306 (1958). These cases provide further evidence that section
1237 can make it more difficult for the taxpayer to obtain capital gains
treatment than under the section 1221 (1) case law.
178. 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959). Among other courts of appeals, only
the Seventh Circuit has also acknowledged the significance of section
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edged that selling a large tract of land in lots often necessitates
constructing access roads, providing drainage, and furnishing
water. Therefore, the court held a taxpayer must be able to
subdivide his land to effect an advantageous sale, and reasonable
efforts in carrying out the subdivision must not defeat capital
gains treatment.179 Moreover, the court specifically noted that
cases in disagreement with this reasoning are also in disharmony
with the legislative purpose of section 1237.180
IV. SUMMARY
Dealers in real property are taxed at ordinary income
rates, while investors who liquidate their holdings are taxed at
preferential capital gains rates. Prior to 1954, the only statutory
guideline for resolving whether a taxpayer was a dealer or an
investor was the vague test under section 117 (a) (1) 181, which
provided that an asset was not capital for tax purposes if it was
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business. The vigorous pursuit by taxpayers for capital gains
treatment, often opposed by the IRS, thus spawned a large
volume of complex and confusing case law. Congress responded
by enacting section 1237, apparently motivated by a desire to
inject clarity into an area of tax law that had become confused
by bewildering court decisions and to at least provide a safe
1237, stating in dicta that it is a new and further definition of the capital
asset concept; it has said nothing more on the subject. Chandler v.
United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955) (decided under the 1939
Code). The court recognized, however, ihe necessity of subdividing very
large tracts of land in order to dispose of them and therefore concluded
that capital gains treatment would be appropriate.
179. 265 F.2d at 520.
180. Id. n.6. It should be noted that this case was decided under
the 1939 Code, and section 1237 therefore was technically inapplicable.
Within the same circuit, a district court has suggested that Congress had
a broader intent in enacting section 1237, observing that the section is
an effort on the part of Congress to straighten out the Commis-
sioner because he had gone so far afield from the intentions of
Congress as to capital assets and capital gains treatment for the
income derived from the sale of such capital assets.
The Commissioner had taken the position over the years
with increasing regularity and some support from courts other
than the Fifth Circuit that the mere fact of subdivision of real
estate put the owner in the real estate business and, ipso facto,
constituted the owner as holding the lots for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business. This will not do. It is not
the law.
Temple v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 687, 692-93 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (also
decided under the 1939 Code).
181. INT. ,Ev. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1), 53 Stat. 50 (now INT. REv.
CoDE OF 1954, § 1221(1) ).
[Vol. 60:275
FAILURE OF SECTION 1237
harbor for capital gains for the investor who must subdivide his
property in order to obtain a reasonable price for it. The section
was thus termed a taxpayer "relief" provision.
The Commissioner's Regulations, however, have so restricted
an already narrowly drawn statute that relatively few taxpayers
could, or would even wish to, comply with it. In the relatively
few cases that have arisen under the statute, it has also been
narrowly construed against the taxpayer. Moreover, in resolving
dealer-investor issues, the courts have been influenced very little
by section 1237, demonstrating small interest in the relief that
Congress intended to provide by enacting it.
V. PROPOSALS
For most landowners, the uncertainties that existed before
the enactment of section 1237 remain. The problem is still in
need of a workable solution. Apart from their function as a tax
incentive, capital gains theoretically should be regarded as gains
that result simply from changes in the market for capital assets-
from fluctuations in the market price for land unrelated to any-
thing the landowner might do to enhance its value. If the land-
owner simply buys land at one price, holds it for a time during
which its value rises, and then later sells it at an increased price,
the gain should be treated as capital gain.
On the other hand, to the extent that the gain is attribut-
able to the personal efforts of the landowner to enhance the
value of the land, the gain is really an indirect form of compen-
sation for personal services and, as such, should be treated as
ordinary income. Such personal efforts may be of the "manu-
facturing" type, whereby the landowner develops the land, sub-
divides it, and improves it to the point where he has truly "manu-
factured" new assets from the old one. They also may be of
the "retailing" type, whereby the profit realized by the owner
is really compensation for his services in creating or enhancing
a market that becomes intent on buying the product from him
because of advertising, a convenient location, his reputation for
honesty and fair dealing, or his possession of information and
expertise.
Applying this theory of capital gains to the taxation of land
transactions, a complete lack of manufacturing and retailing
activities by a taxpayer should conclusively preclude classifica-
tion as a dealer. Mere sales or exchanges of land are not in
themselves manufacturing or retailing activities. These transac-
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tions are more consistent with "investor" or "trader" status than
with "dealer" status.182 Thus, section 1237 should be amended
to provide that:
The mere sale or exchange of real estate shall not be consid-
ered a factor in determining whether the real estate was held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade
or business.
Moreover, this rule should hold true regardless of the
frequency with which a landowner buys and sells parcels of real
estate. Just as with frequent trading in shares of stock, the fact
that the taxpayer buys and sells in. large volume, if that is all
that he does, should merely establish him as a trader, not a
dealer.183 Section 1237 therefore should be further amended to
provide that:
No person shall be deemed to have held real estate primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business solely by reason of the frequency of the sales or ex-
changes of such property and similar property.
Thus the effect of these two proposals would be to eliminate
the present conditions of section 1237 that a lot or parcel sold
must not previously have been held for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business and that in the same tax year in
which such lot or parcel is sold the taxpayer must not have held
any other real property for sale in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. 8 4 Also eliminated would be the condition that the taxpayer
must have held the property for the years prior to sale unless it
had been acquired by inheritance or devise. 8 5
But what if the landowner does engage in some retailing or
manufacturing activities (something other than mere buying and
selling)? At what point does he become a dealer? Section 1237
looks both to the quantity and to the nature of such activities.
Thus the protection of that section vanishes if the taxpayer
makes a "substantial improvement [to the tract] that substan-
tially enhances the value of the lot or parcel sold" by, for
example, constructing streets, curbs, sewers, and water lines.'8 8
If such activities are not "substantial improvements," however,
182. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 2-3 supra and accom-oanying text. Of course, if he
held a parcel of land for less than six months, the taxpayer would be en-
titled only to short-term capital gains treatment; but this would be
equally true had he traded in corporate stock. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 1233.
184. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 (a) (1).
185. Id. § 1237 (a) (3).
186. See notes 94 and 99 supra and accompanying text.
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they will be disregarded and the taxpayer will be allowed to
retain his status as an investor.1 8 7
This approach of section 1237 is valid and should be
preserved. But there is no compelling reason why insubstan-
tial manufacturing or retailing activities in respect of one lot
or parcel that would be disregarded under section 1237 should
become substantial simply because the landowner repeats them
on separate lots or parcels with great frequency. Accordingly,
section 1237 should also provide that:
No person shall be deemed to hold a lot or parcel of real estate
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business unless expenditures in excess of acquisition
cost that are related to such lot or parcel substantially enhance
the value of such lot or parcel.
Direct expenditures related to particular lots or parcels
would be easy to allocate. Indirect expenditures related to more
than one lot or parcel would have to be prorated. The Com-
missioner could develop a method for such allocations--per-
haps on the basis of the acquisition costs of all lots or parcels
owned. For example, if the acquisition cost of lot A accounts
for 10 percent of the acquisition cost of all lots owned during
the period in which $1000 of indirect expenditures were made,
$100 of these indirect expenditures could be allocated to lot A.
Because "substantial enhancement in value" is such a vague
concept, it might be wise to also include a safe harbor in sec-
tion 1237.L88 The taxpayer would then have a choice. He could
rely on the safe harbor or he could battle against "substantial
enhancement" parcel by parcel on the merits. The following
proposed safe harbor limits permissible expenditures to a fixed
percentage of the original cost of the parcel:
No expenditures in excess of the acquisition cost of a lot or par-
cel of real estate that are related to such lot or parcel shall be
deemed to substantially enhance the value of such lot or parcel
so long as such expenditures do not exceed 10 percent of the
acquisition cost of such lot or parcel.
It should be pointed out that this proposal for a safe harbor
ignores the fact that the personal efforts of the landowner
(which cost him nothing except his own time) might have a sig-
nificant impact on the market price for the land. Similarly,
187. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
188. This proposed safe harbor would essentially be an adaptation of
the guideline that currently appears in the Regulations. See note 117 su-
pra and accompanying text. It is intended to cover improvements made
to individual lots or parcels, however, as well as to the tract as a whole.
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even though it would be protected by the safe harbor, a small
expenditure might result in a large increase in market price.
Moreover, the landowner would continue to have some protec-
tion should an impermissibly large expenditure fail to substan-
tially enhance the value of his property. While such an expendi-
ture might take him outside the safe harbor, he could neverthe-
less argue on the merits that the large expenditure did not result
in substantial enhancement in the value of the parcel.
Other landowners merit consideration in addition to those
who engage in a high volume of sales or exchanges but make
only insubstantial improvements and insubstantial retailing ef-
forts relating to each separate lot or parcel. A landowner may
engage in substantial retailing or :manufacturing activities but
do so only once or twice or over a short length of time. These
activities should not put him in the "trade or business" of selling
real estate, since "trade or business" connotes ongoing regular
activities.1 8 9
If real estate is held for personal use, this principle is well
established. Consider, for example, a taxpayer who spends con-
siderable time and energy completely renovating his personal
residence and then, through extensive advertising and other
selling activities, sells it at a handsome profit. No one would
suggest that he is in the trade or business of selling real estate.
Of course, if the taxpayer repeatedly engages in such activity
over an extended period of time, he may then have established
a sufficient pattern of regularity to be deemed to be engaged
in a "trade or business."
The same should hold true for all types of real estate sales.
No taxpayer should be deemed a real estate dealer (even if his
activities serving to enhance the value of a particular lot or par-
cel are substantial) unless his sales occur with regularity.
Because the courts generally have failed to recognize this
proposition, at least when favorable to the taxpayer,190 another
safe harbor should be included in section 1237. A taxpayer
should be allowed to slowly "leak out" his real estate holdings
and still escape classification as a dealer even though his
improvements on each parcel had been substantial:
No person shall be deemed to have held a lot or parcel of real
estate primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
189. See Higgens v. Commissioner, S12 U.S. 212, 215 (1941); Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171-72 (1911) ; note 8 supra.
190. See cases cited in notes 33 and 36 supra.
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his trade or business, regardless of the amount of his expen-
ditures related to such lot or parcel, unless he enters into con-
tracts for or completes at least five separate sales, including the
sale in question, within any three-year period.
This proposal is similar to the "leak out" provisions of rule
144 promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933.191 If a stock-
holder abides by that rule, he may sell restricted securities in
brokers' transactions in an amount no greater than the lesser
of (1) one percent of the total outstanding shares of the class
or (2) the weekly average of trading in such shares on all securi-
ties exchanges. If the safe harbor of rule 144 is successfully
invoked, the stockholder will not be deemed a statutory under-
writer solely because he had engaged in the distribution of such
securities.
In summary, these proposals are aimed first at extending
trader status to taxpayers engaged in real estate transactions.
They provide that dealer status cannot be established merely
because of the high frequency of sales, that high frequency is
not even to be considered in determining dealer status, and that
insubstantial lot-by-lot manufacturing and retailing activities
will not lead to dealer status. Second, these proposals provide
safe harbors for both traders and investor status. Thus a tax-
payer could rely on the "10 percent" safe harbor and be assured
of trader status, or he could rely on the "leak out" safe harbor
and be assured of investor status.
After two decades, section 1237 has proved to be an almost
worthless provision, and the dealer versus investor problems that
prompted its enactment still remain. The time is ripe for
Congress to consider the failure of its earlier effort and enact
legislation that will provide some workable guidelines and infuse
some certainty into this chaotic area of tax law. The proposals
advanced in this Article are offered as one approach to that end.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1975).
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